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INTRODUCTION: TIME, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY
This Article is about the relationship between cultural conceptions of
time-"social time"-and the organization and management of legal insti-
tutions. As an idea, time has profound consequences in its capacity to en-
code and systematize otherwise disparate and unreferenced events and re-
lationships. Concepts of time vary widely around the world, and Western
ideas about time-including the conventional formulation that time moves
in a straight line from past to present, through one's own life-
time-acquired shape and force entirely apart from the scientific "discov-
ery" of time.' This Article focuses in particular on Western ideas about
time, and, even more particularly, on the ways in which temporality suf-
fuses popular understandings of law. Specifically, after some preliminary
ethnological and historical discussion, it offers an analysis of the ways in
which specific indeterminacies in Western notions of time are worked out
in the legal context. Its central thesis is that temporality and legality are
conceptually fused in the West through their mutual implications of a
total order in relation to which social life acquires meaning.
Among the ways in which cultural systems differ-and anthropology is
the study of the significance of cultural difference-are the ways in which
they engage different temporal logics as fundamental rationales of social
organization. Social structure, which preserves essential principles, pur-
poses and institutional forms over the generations, is itself a kind of time-
keeping.2 Anthropologists and scholars in other disciplines have longstand-
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1. See J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORY 233-72 (1989) (discussing time as social and historical questions and "geochronic" or "cos-
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2. See Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Time-reckoning, 12 AFR. 189-216 (1939); Fortes, Time and Social
Structure: An Ashanti Case Study, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE: STUDIES PRESENTED TO A. R. RAD-
CLiFFE-BROWN 54 (M. Fortes ed. 1949).
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ing interests in the connections between social structures and the tempo-
ralities they involve. When sociologists Sorokin and Merton3 coined the
term "social time," they sought an idiom that would capture the multiple
meanings of time beyond the technology of time-reckoning. The idea of
"social time" provides one starting point for this Article.
A second starting point is in the ethnology of law. Ethnology is the
comparative study of sociocultural systems. The ethnology of law and aca-
demic law share a common intellectual ancestor in Sir Henry Maine,
whose Ancient Law explores the sources and meanings of legal innovation
in Roman society and culture.4 His modern inheritors on the anthropolog-
ical side are, in general, concerned with the construction and reproduction
over time of normative orders and their social significance in contempo-
rary societies.5 As the cross-cultural sweep of anthropological studies of
law widens, scholars are increasingly confronted with the fundamentally
different meanings and arrangements that social order entails in the mod-
ern world. Simply stated, notions of what law is and how it operates are
far from universal. While this observation adds to the interest of ethnolog-
ical studies, it also confounds the question of where the starting point of
productive comparison might lie.6
These two points-the social nature of time and the cultural ramifica-
tions of law-converge in issues of the regulation of social processes. In
practice, this means that every culture has some constantly dynamic code
(or, more probably, a set of rival codes) for controlling competition, con-
tradiction, and irony. In effect, such codes are systems of accountability,
for it is through notions of accountability that societies formally attach
social meaning to individual experience. To this we must add the observa-
tion that social systems never sit still, but constantly improvise, negotiate,
contest, celebrate, and lament change. Where institutionalized law exists,
it claims for itself many formal roles in managing normative change.
Time is about many things, but it is always ironic; it always implies
that there is meaning beyond lived experience that nevertheless constitutes
a commentary on lived experience. Time, whatever its "shape," calls forth
loyalties of various kinds: to God, land, descent group, king, nation, em-
ployer, one's children, and so on. Concepts of time might be dominated by
3. Sorokin & Merton, Social Time: A Methodological and Functional Analysis, 42 Am. J. Soc.
615-29 (1937).
4. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1986) (1st ed. 1861).
5. For synoptic views of this literature, see Collier, Legal Processes, in ANNUAL REVIW OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 121; Moore, Law and Anthropology, in BIENNIAL REVIEW OF ANTHROPOLOGY
1969, at 252-300 (B. Siegel ed. 1970); Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, 67 Am. ANTHRO-
POLOGIST 3 (1965); Snyder, Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction, 8
BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 141 (1981); Starr & Collier, Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology, in
HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW 1-28 (J. Starr & J. Collier eds. 1989)
6. See generally J. COMAROFF & S. ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL LOGIC
OF DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 3-21 (1981); C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234
(1983).
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one "shape" or another (e.g., a circle, line, or pendulum motion) or by no
shape at all (later, I call one version of shapeless time "all-times"), but all
concepts of time are flexible, permeable, and capable of proliferation.
Thus, to refer to time's form is inevitably merely a shorthand for referring
to cultural strategies for managing the multiple forms of time that are
simultaneously available in any single social context.' For the same rea-
son, social structures are never permanently fixed or free of internal con-
tradictions that are potentially undermining.
Time could never be socially neutral, even where it appears to Western
eyes to be closest to the "givens" of birth and death. Time is not every-
where thought to be about the interval between birth and death,8 nor eve-
rywhere about "lifetimes" or even individuals.9 The ethnological literature
shows that many concepts of time may be immanent in any single social
system, and even in any single situation. Temporal discourse varies some-
times with age1° and gender," sometimes with status, 2 and, generally,
with differing forms of social participation. Institutions that regulate so-
cial change must also, therefore, regulate the play and contestation of the
multiple temporal logics that inhere in situations, and make temporal
commitments themselves. Thus, the "shapes" of time are not inscribed as
fixed geometric blueprints in a culture's mentalit, but are contested, ne-
gotiated, defended, and transformed in the juxtaposition of personal and
institutional forms that comprise social life anywhere.
To put this more directly: "We" moderns are supposed to know that
time is "really" linear and infinitely so. We are supposed to know that
time is about motion, change, mortality, and progress. We are supposed to
know that linear time rationalized the periodicity of cyclical time and
lifted the veils of timelessness from the now-visible face of human experi-
ence, and that the clock is the essential technology of modern life.I" But
"we" have also devised a strategy for resisting linear time: we imagine
7. One of the premises of this article is that time concepts are always implicitly multiple. In some
contexts, the simultaneity of explicitly competing or divergent temporal forms makes an interesting
subset of the anthropological literature. See C. GEERTZ, Person, Time, and Conduct in Bali, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 360 (1973); A. ORTIZ, THE TEWA WORLD (1969) (on the Tewa
Pueblos of New Mexico); LeGoff, Au Moyen Age: Temps de l'Eglise et Temps du Marchand, 15
ANNALES: E.S.C. 417 (1960) (on medieval Europe); Turton & Ruggles, Agreeing to Disagree: The
Measurement of Duration in a Southwestern Ethiopian Community, 19 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
585 (1978) (on tribal Ethiopians).
8. The dreamtime of the Australian aborigines is not. See, e.g., W. STANNER, WHITE MAN GOT
No DREAMING: ESSAYS 1938-1973, at 23 (1979).
9. Time is about social collectivities among the Merina. See, e.g., Bloch, Death, Women and
Power, in DEATH AND THE REGENERATION OF LIFE 211 (M. Bloch & J. Parry eds. 1982).
10. See, e.g., H. HAZAN, THE LIMBO PEOPLE 89-117 (1980).
11. See, e.g., L. DooB, PATTERNING OF TIME (1971).
12. See, e.g., LeShan, Time Orientation and Social Class, 47 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
589-92 (1952).
13. See generally S. TOULMIN & J. GOODFIELD, THE DIscOvERY OF TIME (1965); Goody,
Time: Social Organization, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 30 (D.
Sills ed. 1968).
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that there exist people not preoccupied with change; we are supposed to
know that some of them are happier, more sociable, more provincial, more
attuned to nature and less skeptical of their rituals.14 If we are romantics,
we imagine ourselves experiencing this liberation in love, faith, or travel
to exotic places. If we are post-moderns, though, we also know that we
are not supposed to think this. 5 The difficulty of developing intellectual
strategies for dismantling the privileges of linear time cross-culturally and,
even more so, in the examination of more familiar cultural terrain, is
compounded by such contemporary Western engagements with the idea of
time.
I. LINEAR TIME
The idea of linear time that now dominates public life in the West (and
elsewhere) was not indigenous to the West. Linear time came to Europe
with Christianity. 6 It was the concern of specialists-theologians-and
became a popular idea by a long, slow, and interesting process. European
conceptions of time underwent a major transformation beginning in the
late twelfth century. It was then that the popularization of linear time
was greatly accelerated by a wide variety of changes in thought and public
life. 7 The European invention of the mechanical clock (though this was
not the first mechanical clock) in 1354 gave impetus and definition to new
ideas about time.'
8
The expansion of Christianity into Europe brought with it two ideas
about time that had long roots in Jewish and autochthonous Christian
tradition: first, the origin of time in Creation, and second, the end of time
in a Day of Judgment. The linearity of time derives simply from the geo-
metric connection between these two endpoints.'9 These arrived as new
ideas to Europe, and it is difficult to know how they affected ordinary
people as they encountered them in the long process of Europe's conver-
sion to Christianity.
20
14. See generally Bloch, The Past and the Present in the Present, 12 MAN 278-92 (1977).
15. See J. FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT (1983).
16. See LeGoff, supra note 7. The idea of linear time as the segment between creation and Judg-
ment Day was initially a theological concern, and gradually became laicized. 0. CULLMANN, CHRIST
and TIME: THE PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF TIME AND HISTORY 51-60 (F. Filson
trans. 1964).
17. See, e.g., J. HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1924) (new humanism and
industrial workshops).
18. See L. MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 13 (1934).
19. See 0. CULLMANN, supra note 16, at 51.
20. Goody's analysis of changes in family structure and inheritance as a result of early Church
conversion efforts beginning in the fourth century suggests that local populations responded to Church
doctrine fairly quickly. J. GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE
33, 44-46 (1983). But other social historians suggest that the idea of one's own lifetime as personal
property came much later. E. LADURIE, MONTAILLOU (1978); J. LEGOFF, POUR UN AUTRE MOYEN
AGE: TEMPS, TRAVAIL ET CULTURE EN OCCIDENT (1977); Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline and
Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST & PRESENT 56-97 (1967). This is not necessarily a contradiction, in
that there is no reason to think that the implications of linear time were fully worked out or unchang-
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The early theologians wrote about time as "a segment of eternity";
eternity is "endless time."'" Time was believed to belong to God, a belief
which had numerous practical consequences as well as theoretical ones.22
The keystone of medieval philosophy was the proposition that God is not
only the unique "total being" (totum esse) but also the unique "true be-
ing" (verum esse); hence, the visible, sensible world was by definition
(since God monopolizes all authenticity) "mere appearance. '2 3 Time,
which was limited to the world of humankind, represents this incomplete-
ness in this worldview. Individuals could aspire to completion only in sal-
vation, that is, in joining God. God, always (and uniquely) total and true,
existed outside of time, since there was nothing else that he could become,
or could have been. Thus, the social logic of linear time took shape.
Late medieval Christianity was by no means a single entity,2 but his-
torians stress the prevalence and persistence of ideas of time and eter-
nity.25 All of time was the history of salvation; therefore, the very idea of
duration was charged with sacred significance.26 Linear time became the
constant marker of the contingent and incomplete nature of human society
and of every individual's life.27 The advancement of time, always toward
Judgment Day, represented the advancement of human perfectibility, al-
ways relative to the perfect completeness of God. Time was "a certain
mode of existence proper to contingent things, unable to realize themselves
all at once in the permanence of a stable present."28 The instant was
drenched in the poignancy of impossibility: the impossibility of refusing
the struggle for perfection, and the impossibility of succeeding in it. This
irony became the very meaning-the enduring meaning-of the idea of a
lifetime.29
ing (they continue to be worked out and to change now), or that they were experienced
simultaneously.
21. See 0. CULLMANN, supra note 16, at 62-63; see also LeGoff, supra note 7, at 419.
22. See J. LEGOFF, LA CIVILISATION DE L'OCCIDENT MEDIPVAL 169-248 (1965); R. TAWNEY,
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1962).
23. See E. GILSON, THE SPIRIT OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 64 (A.H.C. Downes trans. 1940).
24. See G. LEFF, HERESY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: THE RELATION OF HETERODOXY TO
DISSENT C. 1250-c. 1450, at 26 (1967).
25. See J. LEGOFF, supra note 22, at 211-12; Dales, Discussions of the Eternity of the World
During the First Half of the Twelfth Century, 57 SPECULUM 495-508 (1982).
26. See LeGoff, supra note 7, at 420.
27. See E. GILSON, supra note 23, at 385.
28. Id.
29. However great the significance and anxiety about the impending day of judgment, ordinary
medieval Europeans were unconcerned with time-keeping and recording time, see 1 M. BLOCH, FEu-
DAL SOCIETY ch. 5, § 1 (1964); M. GILMORE, THE WORLD OF HUMANISM 1453-1517, at 201
(1952); E. LADURIE, supra note 20; J. LEGOFF, supra note 22, at 222, though medieval time-keeping
methods are not well understood today. Wolff, Le Temps et Sa Mesure au Moyen Age, 17 ANNALES:
E.S.C. 1141-45 (1962). The idea of life as a measurable property received an incalculable impetus
from the invention of the mechanical clock in the middle of the fourteenth century. L. MUMFORD,
supra note 18, at 14. Although the inspiration for this innovation may have been the needs of clerics,
id. at 12, its widespread use facilitated the laicization of time, J. LEGOFF, supra note 20, at 67. The
clock rapidly became an urban phenomenon, a key symbol of secular power. Debates over the connec-
tion between forms of power and technologies of time-reckoning suggest that the connection is con-
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Eventually, clocks moved from steeples to palaces and town halls, as
potent symbols of dominion. The ticking clock was not only a memento
mori, but a reminder of the ownership of time. The fact that debates over
wages, interest payments and secular government in general took place in
these terms underscores the extent to which linear time calls forth a decla-
ration of the ultimate instrumentality of time in social terms." Linear
time is time with a purpose: a time-for-the-sake-of-God, -state, -shop, -
self, among other possibilities. The linearity of time reproduces both the
cry for redemption and redemption's form in its fundamental proposition
that the individual can find completion only by participating in a cosmic
order-through social institutions that await the end of time.
II. THE INDETERMINACIES OF LINEAR TIME
One way of summing up this discussion of linear time in Europe is to
say that linear time's most powerful claim is that of its own redemptive
power in relation to an individual's life (for example, fulfillment always
implies a passage of time in this worldview). There is where the redemp-
tive promise of linear time lies. There is where linear time provides a
reservoir of symbols with which the legitimacy of hierarchies can be de-
fended and reproduced. But there is precisely where linear time must de-
fend itself conceptually, since any life entails multiple and simultaneous
engagements involving competing priorities and loyalties. Linear time in-
trinsically demands a single principle of selection (or a single hierarchy of
principles; for example, a subject simultaneously serves the king and God,
because the king serves God), but real life is not so neatly arranged.
Linear time did not displace indigenous time concepts in Europe so
much as it added itself to them in the life of the new institutions which
made linear time socially relevant. As we have already seen, to the extent
that people cared about time at all, their temporality was cyclical, organ-
ized in terms of binary oppositions (day/night, summer/winter, et cetera)
between which time moved in pendulum fashion." As new institutional
forms developed-industrial workshops, the state, contracts and
courts-different forms of time multiplied as they were juxtaposed in con-
tiguous social fields. Such proliferations continue today, in the West as
well as the other places where different temporalities come into contact as
social tensions-for example, work and family life, the market and faith,
aspiration and consolation.
vincing in general, but controversial in detail; for additional data and discussion of these controversies,
see D. LANDES, THE REVOLUTION IN TIME (1983); J. NEEDHAM, W. LING & D.J. DESOLLA
PRICE, HEAVENLY CLOCKWORK: THE GREAT ASTRONOMICAL CLOCKS OF MEDIEVAL CHINA
(1960). In any event, L. MUMFORD, supra note 18, at 14-17, ascribes the symbolic power of the clock
to its dissociation of time from human events; time-keeping became time-serving.
30. See J. LEGOFF, supra note 20; R. TAWNEY, supra note 22, at 44-55; Thomas, Work and
Leisure in Pre-industrial Societies, 29 PAST & PRESENT 50-62 (1964).
31. See E. LEACH, RETHINKING ANTHROPOLOGY 124 (1961).
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If linear time dominates our public lives it is because its primary effi-
cacy is in the construction and management of dominant social institu-
tions, not because it is the only "kind" of time that is culturally available.
Linear time in the West was popularized by the church, by monarchs,
and eventually by other elites who found in an image of time's unidirec-
tional progress the central symbol of their legitimacy. Linear time, how-
ever, cannot fulfill its own claims to redemptive completeness without bor-
rowing from the other temporal idioms that express other, equally sacred
meanings from other domains, for example, the idioms of cyclical time.
Cyclical time idioms suffuse Western concepts of private life and personal
life: birth and death, the generations, dust to dust, the ages of man, mar-
riage, parenting-all of these cultural images invoke cyclical time.
Indeed, cyclical and linear time compete with each other in Western
culture. Their clearest competition is in cultural notions of the individual
life, which is itself an intersection of two domains: ideas about the crea-
tion of life (birth, maturity, aging, death), and other ideas about the
meaning of life. Cyclical time offers the primary idiom of life's creation as
the reciprocal of personal death. Linear time makes a person's life just
another segment in the larger progress of time in relation to eternity (to
the extent that modern secular thinking does not utterly conflate time and
eternity). Cyclical time emphasizes substance in its constant alternation
(in the Western case) between opposed and reciprocal states (for example,
life and death, hot and cold, day and night). Linear time emphasizes his-
torical form in its continual juxtaposition of equivalent intervals.
Both forms of time share and express a long Indo-European cultural
tradition that stresses the reciprocal relationship of society and cosmos, the
eternity of matter, the infinity of time and the inevitability of change,3"
although they do so in substantially different ways. Where cyclical time
makes death the source of life, linear time makes God the source of time.
Where the infinity of time is represented as an unending cycle or pendu-
lar motion, it can also be expressed as an unending line. Where constant
change can be conceptualized as cyclic, linear time expresses a unique
cycle (the world being said to have been created only once, by God, a "big
bang" or whatever) that is itself a manipulation of the idea of cyclicity.
Linear time does not so much replace cyclical time, as literally reform it
within its same general framework. But the reformulation of time can be
achieved only if the crucial differences among time's forms can be effec-
tively suppressed. The difference between death as a source of life, and
death as the marker of an ineluctable ending, or the difference between
life as an event and life as a condition-these differences must somehow
be blurred. By rendering the differences indeterminate, this blurring of
32. See B. LINCOLN, MYTH, COSMOS AND SOCIETY: INDO-EUROPEAN THEMES OF CREATION
AND DESTRUCTION 140 (1986).
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particular points of competition among forms of time can be effectively
managed. Linear time involves two crucial kinds of indeterminacy-one in
the construction of the lifetime (as reciprocal or interval), and the other in
the representation of the completeness time claims to represent (linear ver-
sus cyclical infinity). Perhaps these are only two sides of the same concep-
tual coin, in that both involve the "sites" where the respective geometries
of linear and cyclical time most conspicuously converge in the individual
on the one hand and in ultimate things on the other.
The affirmative power of linear time is in its ability to resolve tensions
among priorities, loyalties, and accountabilities. But such power is lost if
rival temporalities lose their power to create tension. To put this another
way, linear time can dominate a society only if its beneficiaries carefully
manage the indeterminacies discussed here, loosening time's "line" to en-
gage the widest possible array of human commitments, but tightening it
again when the efficacy of public institutions is at stake. We will return to
this idea later.
III. TIME, LAW AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Although the discussion so far makes use of historical data, the analysis
is not historical, but cultural. That is, it is about relationships among sys-
tems of ideas rather than about events and motives. Cultural analysts
stress the self-referential aspects of systems of ideas, but this is not to say
that ideas are born in vacuums. A single idea may have many expressions,
and so anthropologists are as concerned with how principles of selection
develop in relation to the myriad possible enactments of cultural proposi-
tions as they are with the propositions themselves. In the case of Europe-
ans' popularizations of linear time, the context is important in shedding
light on how the meanings of linear time have become what they are.
Hence the discussion in the previous Section. This Section highlights three
aspects of that context that have particular bearing on the modern mean-
ings of law in the West.
First, the secularization of linear time-moving the clock from the
church steeple to the palace turret-represented a major strategic innova-
tion of medieval statecraft. In effect, by borrowing the church's idiom that
situated time in relation to eternity, secular temporal discourse achieved a
reification of society by locating the end of time outside of any individual
or collective social experience. "Society" thus became a conceptual union
of time and place (here is to there as now is to then). This analogy is by
no means universal around the world, since its underlying premise (the
differentiation of places in terms of the passage of time) is not universal.
It is worth noting in passing that society reified in this way cannot escape
at least a rhetorical commitment to "progress" as a way of connecting
"societies" at different points in time.
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Second, secular monarchies eventually resolved the contradictions be-
tween an enduring kingship and a mortal king with the notion of "the
king's two bodies," that is, differentiating between the office of the king
and the occupant of the office.3" This conceptualization of incumbency is
not universal, either, though it is by no means unique to Europe.34 Before
the idea of the King's two bodies was established, the king had become the
symbol of the state, as shown by the idea of treason, new in Edward III's
time in England.35 Treason in England acquired statutory definition
before any other crime (in 1352); that is, the symbolic status of the state
was (and had to be) established before acts could be prosecuted in "its"
name. The important point here is that this symbolic status was achieved
by regularizing the temporal contradictions of kingship by embracing both
the king's mortal person and the enduring kingship within a single insti-
tutional form. The scholarly assessment that Europe's legal development
was revolutionary in the medieval period appears to be widely accepted. 6
Third, by the time the modern period began, law had become the domi-
nant image of conflict resolution,37 linking king and subject-at least hy-
pothetically-in the integument of everyday life. Extensive changes in Eu-
ropean legal institutions and law were but one element of wider patterns
of social and cultural change. This was the era that saw the development
of cities,38 major changes in church doctrine,39 and profound changes in
the structure of the economy. By the end of the medieval period, Europe
had the common law, written contracts, juries, academic law, and, more
generally, a wider use of the law, in the prosecution and defense of indi-
vidual interests.40 In any event, both legal institutions and their pattern of
use at the end of the medieval period seem relatively more familiar to the
modern eye than what preceded it.4"
33. See E. KANTOROWIcZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES (1963).
34. See, e.g., J. GOODY, SUCCESSION TO HIGH OFFICE (1966).
35. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 287-89 (3d ed. 1927).
36. See, e.g., M. GIBBS, FEUDAL ORDER 106 (1949). For a discussion of the development of
English common law, see A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 13 (1966).
37. See J. Bossy, DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST
287 (1983) (discussing images of feud, charity, and law).
38. See C. CIPOLLA, BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 143-49 (2d ed. 1980).
39. See, e.g., J. LEGOFF, LA NAISSANCE DU PURGATOIRE 9 (1981) ("invention" of Purgatory).
40. See I M. BLOCH, supra note 29, at 113-20. The fifteenth century was "the golden age of
litigation," Kagan, A Golden Age of Litigation: Castile 1500-1700, in DISPUTES AND SETTLE-
MENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 145-66 (J. Bossy ed. 1983) [hereinafter DIS-
PUTES AND SETTLEMENTS], so widespread had it become-and the most frequent litigant was the
king.
41. Anglo-Saxon law was kin-based. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 31 (2d ed. 1959). Land disputes were regularly
resolved through trial by battle, A. HARDING, supra note 36, at 41, and the blood feud persisted in
northern Europe until "well into the medieval period." Wormald, The Blood Feud in Early Modern
Scotland, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS, supra note 40, at 101, 102. An early role of the church
in local dispute settlement in sixth-century Gaul was to intervene to end blood feuds; records from this
period also show the legal use of ordeals and oaths. See James, 'Beati pacjfici': Bishops and the Law
in Sixth-Century Gaul, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS, supra note 40, at 25, 32-33. The ancient
law of Belgium and northern France distinguished not personal rights but family rights. 1 E.M.
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The common law, which developed at this period, in some respects re-
flects perfectly a logic of linear time, in its reliance on precedent, its com-
mitment to reform, and its acknowledgment of individual persons and
rights. But the common law also involves larger claims beyond linear
time. Reasoning by analogy to precedent creates a false historicity in that
it perpetually reclaims the past for the present: in theory, a dispute in
1989 can be resolved by reference to cases from 1889 or 1389. "The law"
thus accumulates, but it never passes; at any instant, it represents a total-
ity. It is by definition complete, yet its completeness does not preclude
change. It is a human achievement, yet, by its reversible and lateral excur-
sions, and by its collective voice, it is not identifiably the product of any
particular individual or group. Symbolically, it stands at the border be-
tween the two great zones of Indo-European thinking-the human-made
(the anthropogonic) and the divine (cosmogonic)-and is nourished by the
indeterminacy of the distinction between events in linear time and pos-
sibilities (all-times). 2
Law"' has a mythic dimension, in its self-totalization, its quality of be-
ing in time (in that it is a human product) but also out of time (where did
it or does it begin or end?) and in its promise of systematic yet permutable
meaning. This myth is essentially a temporal one. Specifically, the law's
implicit claim is to invoke the total system of its own distinctions simulta-
neously in a way that both individualizes subjects/citizens and orients
them toward particular forms of action.44 That such symbolism has been
effective only since the late Middle Ages reveals the continued capacity of
modern society to generate myth. For the myth to remain viable, the law
must continually reiterate the distinctions between law and interests, the
ephemeral and the enduring, the political and the sacred.
MEIERS, ETUDES D'HISTOIRE Du DROiT 228 (1956). The same could be said of England, where the
early state had to compete against the family. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 31. After
the Normans appeared concepts of absolute liability, id. at 54, both apparently successfully directed at
strengthening and extending the power of the king over a hostile countryside. The regularization of
law in England under the Normans is credited with resolving serious problems of disorder which had
persisted since the break-up of tribal kingdoms in the eighth century. M. GIBBS, supra note 36, at 60.
42. Berman argues that the critical formative issue in modem Western law is its origins in canon
law, and the canon law's embedded premises about the contingencies of the Last Days. Thus, the
modem nation would involve conceptions of transcendence. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 49-119 (1983).
43. I use the word "law" in the broad sense here and below, acknowledging distinctions to be
drawn in some contexts (but not, I think, in this Article) among the common law, constitutional law,
and statutory interpretation. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitu-
tional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1975). In general, my usage emphasizes cultural
ideas about law, which may or may not be descriptive of legal operations.
44. I take this definition of myth from the work of Claude LEvi-Strauss. See, e.g., C. Lpvl-
STRAUSS, THE JEALOUS POTTER (1988).
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IV. THE LAW AND ITS TIMES
So far, this Article has focussed on general issues of social structure,
temporality, and law in Europe and the West. In effect, the argument has
been that, given the social context in which linear time was received and
popularized in Europe, linear time is "about" the crucial indeterminacies
between the individual lifetime and the enduring public institutions which
claim an individual's consciousness and, potentially, service. These inde-
terminacies are essential in that they go to the very crux of what linear
time is "for" in the West, that is, the redemption of individual lifetimes
through participation in the social and cosmic order. Further, they must
be preserved as indeterminacies for the system to work. In the West, it is
the law's cultural role to do just this. The law represents itself in ways
that situate it at precisely these indeterminate points, resolving conflicts
one at a time while gesturing toward the totality of all resolutions of all
hypothetically possible conflicts. (The contrast at issue in that gesture is
that of an actual human being, as opposed to the printed words "plaintiff"
and "defendant.") Western cultural notions of law give it this mythic as-
pect, which is by no means universally the "property" of the law.
Let us turn now to a modern, familiar social field in which these
themes are expressed, negotiated, and reproduced. The remainder of this
Article offers an extended illustrative case, and that is in the general do-
main of judicial succession at the United States Supreme Court. I have
chosen the Supreme Court because it is the highest court of the nation,
and so by its very nature must be concerned with strategies for defining
and protecting its own unique status as the ultimate national legal au-
thority. I focus on succession because it is there that anthropologists look
to find the most explicit cultural definition of office in relation to social
structures and groups. An office is a scarce resource, and the cultural con-
cerns that surround its allocation are highly revealing of indigenous con-
ceptions of social structure."' Eligibles may be determined in any number
of ways-from primogeniture to battle to popular election and so on-but
they are determined somehow, and that is key. Installation may be
marked with ceremony, or it may not, and these rituals are laden with
significance for anyone interested in the wider meanings encoded in sys-
tems of statuses and roles. The ethnological literature is helpful on each of
these points.
Judicial succession is particularly relevant to the general problem of
this Article in that it is precisely in succession that multiple temporali-
ties-of the law, personal lifetimes, and public lives-and their indetermi-
nacies must be worked out. I must stress that I refer here to cultural
45. See J. GooDY, supra note 34, at 2.
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representations of succession-the ideal-and, eventually, the sorts of
practical problems that those ideals generate.
The law in the United States (but not only there) must juggle at least
three essentially different forms of time. First, at least in public life,
Americans inherit a dominant temporal culture that stresses the linear,
infinite nature of time and simultaneously the finite irreversibility of any
individual's lifetime. This means that while modern secular thought sus-
pends the beginning and end points of time as indeterminate, it nonethe-
less celebrates them in the "certainty" of time's passage from past to pre-
sent. No two moments repeat, and the passage of time is both regular and
regulated according to international standards.4 This is the kind of time
of ethnic and national histories.'
7
But a second temporality is in the law itself. As we have already pro-
posed, the law involves the constant expansion of a linear time framework
(in the production and use of "precedent," for example, but not only by
extending the "time-line" further forward or back). This is a form of
timelessness, or, more accurately, all-times, a form of time which stipu-
lates time as social, but not with geometric metaphors. Importantly, the
endpoint of the law in time is neither fixed nor envisioned. Significantly,
though, it is symbolically coterminous with a national social life, and it
represents that national life in temporal terms.48 As mentioned earlier, the
mythic aspects of law that inhere in this conception of things set the law
apart from the many other institutions in which conflicts can be resolved
and the normative repertoire adjusted. The mythic aspects of the law that
inhere in its special expanded temporality are essential to its claims to
neutrality, both in the sense of being capable of balancing competing in-
terests, and engaging in a values discourse." If linear time is the time that
connects individual interests to the state, then neutrality in a linear time
idiom requires a symbolism of all-times.50
The time of the law is distinctive not only for its cumulative aspect, but
also because it is reversible. The law exists in reversible time in two
senses, that is, in that prior decisions can control present ones, and also in
46. See Zerubavel, The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective, 88 AM. J. Soc. 1
(1982).
47. See Chock, The Outsider Wife and the Divided Selfi The Genesis of Ethnic Identities, in
DISCOURSE AND THE SOCIAL LIFE OF MEANING 185-204 (P. Chock & J. Wyman eds. 1986); Kahn,
Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 509 (1988). For a
discussion of neutrality in the ethnology of law, see Greenhouse, Mediation: A Comparative Ap-
proach, 20 MAN 90-114 (1985).
48. See Kahn, supra note 47, at 508-16.
49. That justices themselves must struggle with the meaning of neutrality is also relevant here.
See Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Pow-
ell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987).
50. Neutrality is defined differently around the world, as well as in different situations in the
same context, along several converging continua: knowing or not knowing the parties, having an inter-
est in the outcome or not, participating as an equal or as a superior-the anthropological literature on
law offers multiple examples of each of these possibilities.
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that prior decisions can be reversed. The reversible aspect of the law is
another important hallmark of its mythic nature. It symbolically under-
scores its claims to transcend any particular era or individual's life (more
on this below). It also symbolically connects the law to nature itself-that
peculiarly reasoned and authored nature of the late eighteenth century
that made God, law, reason, and nature share a single set of principles. 1
I will argue later that the law's particular temporality generates the key
symbols of the American judiciary-even though the law has many
sources, and modern skepticism has challenged the specifics (though not
the symbols in the civic culture) of the enlightenment view of things.52
But finally, there is a third kind of time embedded in the law, and that
is the judges' own lifetimes. In stark contrast-the starkest possible-to
the law's self-totalizing, reversible, and boundless accumulations, judges'
lives are finite. This problem is by no means unique to judicial succession
in the United States. Any conception of time that has shape and direction
focuses attention on the incongruities of sustaining the legitimacy of the
system while vesting individuals with its authority. In the special time of
the law, which is multidirectional rather than nondirectional, qualification
becomes a particular cultural dilemma as well as a practical problem that
goes to the very heart of the judiciary's cultural legitimacy.
In the process of filling a vacant seat on the Supreme Court, all three of
these times come vibrantly into play. A vacancy is ordinarily caused by
the death of the incumbent, or anticipated age- or health-related decline of
competence. Life tenure potentially secures long service from an individ-
ual Justice, and yet his or her performance can involve no conspicuous
apprenticeship. The new Justice will be selected by the two "other," po-
litical branches of government, and is in itself a partisan, if not political,
event.53 The special temporal symbolism of the law requires a special
"kind" of person, one who will find the law, not make it; know the law,
but not preach it; be a representative of the national community, but have
no causes of his or her own. These three temporal charters are by no
means easily reconciled. Their reconciliation is possible only with the deft
management of essential temporal symbols, that is, by downplaying or
51. M. HoRwrlz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 7 (1977).
52. Ferguson notes that this particular equation (linking law, reason, and nature) emerged in
American culture only after the Revolution. R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERs IN AMERICAN CUL-
TURE 15-16 (1984). By the time Chief Justice Marshall retired in 1835, the Supreme Court had
become "the great oracle of Americanism." Id. at 23.
53. The fact that the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees are now televised, and
widely viewed, reinforces several aspects of the process from a cultural perspective. As Gitlin suggests
in his discussion of the impact of the televised Watergate hearings, public participation in the process
via television tends to sharpen the cultural distinction between an office and its incumbent. T. GITLIN,
WATCHING TELEVISION 31 (1986). Yet the media "transform the great silence of things into its
opposite" by means of a narrative of "what's-going-on." M. DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF
EVERYDAY LIFE 185 (S. Rendall trans. 1984). This is radically at odds with the public silence the
Justices conventionally preserve about the development and negotiation of judicial opinions.
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suppressing altogether aspects of a judicial "career" that entail becoming.
It is in becoming a judge that any tensions between individuality and a
judicial persona would be most evident. 4
V. LAW, LIFE, AND TIME
Regular succession to office calls not only for institutionalizing the prin-
ciples by which competition for office can be controlled (this is what suc-
cession means), but also for sequencing eligibility for office. Another way
of stating this is that we speak of "succession" when it is a question of the
incumbent's fitting the role, rather than the other way around. The ethno-
logical literature offers highly diverse examples of modes of succession and
their accompanying ritualizations."
Before reopening the cross-cultural questions, though, we must consider
what sort of person is culturally considered to be qualified for the Su-
preme Court. 6 The answer would not stir much controversy; what fol-
lows is literally a textbook definition:
One, demonstrated judicial temperament. Two, professional exper-
tise and competence. Three, absolute personal as well as professional
integrity. Four, an able, agile, lucid mind. Five, appropriate profes-
sional educational background or training. Six, the ability to commu-
nicate clearly, both orally and in writing, especially the latter.
57
Several things are striking about this set of criteria: first, they are
presented as if they describe an exceptional individual, yet they evoke at-
tributes that one might assume are widely and positively valued in society.
Second, the list is evenly balanced among general statements of profes-
sional experience and personal attributes that are not aspects of experi-
ence. Third, the description implies that a judicial temperament is rein-
forced by the ability to reason; furthermore, while communication skills
are clearly important, it is not ordinary social conversation that is key, but
"especially" one's writing ability. Murphy offers a metaphor for this per-
sonal and professional elite when he refers to the Justices' "performance
of their priestly duty of expounding the meaning of that holy writ [the
Constitution]."58 The metaphor is perhaps at the heart of the matter: in
the United States, the judiciary is the only robed branch. The robes (like
those of American academics in procession) are those of (medieval) clerics.
54. Kantorowicz describes parallel debates over kingship in ancient Greece, as to whether the
person who becomes king does so by receiving grace at the moment of installation, or by imitating the
divine. E. KANTOROWICZ, supra note 33, at 500.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 61-69.
56. Again, I must stress that this is not the same as asking what sorts of persons have actually
been considered for the Supreme Court; this article is about idealizations and symbols.
57. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO
THE SUPREME COURT 4 (2d ed. 1985).
58. W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 16 (1964).
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In effect, in terms of the symbolic claims of their office, Justices must
literally embody neutrality; they are literally "judicial bodies." That their
relationship to the law is metonymic rather than metaphoric implies im-
portant cultural constraints on the notion of representation as an aspect of
the judicial role. In the case of the Supreme Court, the kind of neutrality
that is culturally valued is a very particular one, in that the Justices are
accountable "to the people" but in a way that precludes any legitimate
scope for the expression of their own interests or personal views. Indeed,
they are "supposed" to have no interests; this renunciation of particular
private interests symbolically inverts to become, in effect, an embrace of
all public interests."9 The alternative (renunciation as other-worldly)
would contradict the other stipulations that a Justice be an exemplary
individual without being a hero. A Justice should reason, without the ex-
ercise of will; 0 a Justice must be the law, but he must also be society
without representing either. Such are the symbolic prescriptions of the
judicial office.
While the prescription for eligibility to the Court clearly demands an
exceptional individual, it is mute on the question of how and when an
individual comes to be inscribed with these qualities. This is an important
cultural silence: at stake in it are other, larger questions about the nature
of social life. For example, if Justices are literally to be found, then the
implication is that there is a natural hierarchy of men and women that
makes some fit for service and others not, and the authority and power of
the President and Senate are symbolically downplayed. On the other
hand, if Justices are made at the moment of their nomination-if it is
then, and only then, that their renunciation of private interests takes
place-then the conceptualization of the law is democratized and the au-
thority and power of the President and Senate to select the Justice are
symbolically emphasized. This is something of a dilemma for a society
culturally committed to ideals of egalitarianism as well as the equality of
the three branches of government. In effect, the time of the nation (linear,
progressive time) and the time of the law (linear, cumulative time) com-
pete for symbolic dominance over the process.
The installation of new Justices is so minimally ritualized-American
civic ritual is characteristically truncated-that one must look elsewhere
for signs of how the explicit negotiation of the law's multiple temporalities
might proceed. Here, the ethnological literature is helpful, particularly
where the temporal indeterminacies of law are roughly congruent. Such
59. See Kahn, supra note 49, at 56-57.
60. Id. at 4-5. Kelman develops Unger's discussion of the distinction between desire and reason in
liberal thought; desire individuates and reason universalizes. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 65 (1987). Later, Kelman relates this world view to a vision of law and truth as
being beyond history. Id. at 229. See also Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 19-26 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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congruence can be found in the traditional ritual chieftainships of central
and westein Africa, which also symbolically addressed incongruities
among simultaneous temporalities, in ways that make their juxtaposition
to American Justices productive. A brief excursion follows.
Chiefs, who ordinarily were members of a royal or chiefly clan or line-
age, were understood to be otherwise ordinary mortal men. The chiefship,
on the other hand, was associated with the regulation of the rains and
other enduring natural cycles. Thus, the two salient temporalities were
those of individual lifetimes and the larger cyclical idioms that expressed
the society's relationship to nature." Furthermore, at least among the
Bashu of Eastern Zaire, the chiefship itself (as opposed to the chief)
marked the cycles of time. When the ritual chief died, or failed to ritually
protect the land, pollution (which is always present) accumulated along
with other negative social effects, and famine resulted; in practice, the one
was literally the sign of the other: "The power of chiefship . . is thus
seen as fluctuating through time. It is, in fact, viewed as an almost organic
substance that grows, declines, and is reborn. . . .Thus the waxing and
waning of the land, cycles of plenty and famine, are directly tied to the
waxing and waning of chiefship."62 The role of the ritual chief was com-
plex; at its core, he absorbed the pollution that otherwise would have
poisoned the community by fixing it in his own body.
Central African chiefs came to their offices by a combination of factors,
both ascribed and achieved. While they might become eligible for the
chiefship by virtue of their birth, their actual candidacy was a function of
their performance skills in the conduct of the community's affairs.63 A
central political arena (where such skills could be appropriately displayed)
in traditional villages was the court, where royal representatives, or the
king himself, heard disputes in a public forum.64 Chiefdoms and king-
doms identified strongly with their own law; many indigenous African
cultures had an explicit cultural category for law. 5 The law and the so-
cial existence of the community were symbolically coterminous, in contrast
to power, which was the property of the royal lineage or the kingship
itself.6
61. See M. FORTES, RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE PERSON: ESSAYS ON TALLENSI RELIGION
94 (1987); R. PACKARD, CHIEFSHIP AND COSMOLOGY: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF POLITICAL COM-
PETITION 24-32 (1981).
62. See R. PACKARD, supra note 61, at 31.
63. See J. COMAROFF & S. ROBERTS, supra note 6; M. FORTES, supra note 61, at 87; Jones,
Chiefly Succession in Basutoland, in SUCCESSION TO HIGH OFFICE 57, 61 (J. Goody ed. 1966);
Southwold, Succession to the Throne in Buganda, in id. at 82, 91-92.
64. See M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODE-
SIA 1-34 (1967).
65. See, e.g., id.; J. COMAROFF & S. ROBERTS, supra note 6.
66. See Southwold, supra note 63, at 82-126.
I use the past tense here because it is temporally accurate, not because the nature of "traditional"
or indigenous law is in any way a settled question wherever it has been described. Chanock examines
at length the indigenous referents of contemporary "customary" law in Malawi and Zambia. M.
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Thus, at stake in succession were not only the symbolic efficacy of the
law, but also the literal health of the chiefdom-perhaps each was the
corollary of the other. The investiture ceremony among the Bashu un-
folded around the central imagery of the new ritual chief's social rebirth.67
The candidate was given a funeral, and then a surrogate mother, and
finally a new social identity as ritual chief. Indeed, throughout central and
west Africa the dominant mode of the investiture ceremony appears to
have been that of the funeral; at death, the subject-candidate died, the
chief was born.6" These societies addressed the dilemma of the incum-
bent's single lifetime in relation to the law by symbolically dividing it,
letting the ordinary man with his private interests die, and setting the
stage for the birth of the new ritual chief who served the entire commu-
nity. He was symbolically-which is to say literally-not the same
person.
The installation ceremony among the Bashu also addressed the other
dimension of the law's temporality, and that is its identity with the ebb
and flow of nature and society. To be more accurate, that ebb and flow is
the circulation of pollution, from the bush to the village and back again.
When all is well, the ritual chief kept the pollution at bay by means of his
ritual expertise and his ability to absorb (literally to incorporate) the pol-
lution that would otherwise poison the community. The installation cere-
mony commented on this theme in detail. Since the installation followed
the death of a ritual chief who was by definition polluted by virtue of his
performance of office, that pollution had to be discharged in a purification
rite. Eventually, the new chief, as part of his ceremonial, took on this
pollution and transferred it to the bush, leading the way to his own purifi-
cation. Pollution could not be purified but only ritually displaced; hence
the importance of maintaining the succession of the ritual chief, 9 and the
succession ritual itself.
Let us return now to the American case, reiterating briefly some paral-
lels with the African contexts briefly described above, and then some con-
trasts. First, in both the American and African contexts, law is equated
with social health.71 Second, in both contexts law is distinguished from
CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND
ZAMBIA (1985). Moore challenges the notion that customary law was in any sense of the word tradi-
tional or indigenous. S. MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: "CUSTOMARY" LAW ON KIL-
MANJARO, 1880-1980 (1986).
67. I refer particularly to the Bashu because their ceremony is described in rich detail by Packard.
See R. PACKARD, supra note 61, at 34-42.
68. In addition to Packard, see Forde, Death and Succession, in ESSAYS ON THE RITUAL OF
SOCIAL RELATIONS 89-123 (M. Gluckman ed. 1962).
69. This is also true among the Tallensi and Ashanti. See M. FORTES, supra note 61, at 94.
70. There is also an interesting difference at this juncture. Where the African cultures do not
define conflict in itself as antisocial or asocial, they do define the community in terms of controlling its
antithesis, that is, nature. American culture, too, locates the antithesis of community in nature. In the
American case, however, it is conflict that is considered antisocial or asocial, a sign of the "untamed"
and therefore, symbolically devalued. See Greenhouse, Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation
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politics, even though legal officials might in practice be important political
actors. Third, legal officials, by their office, mark their distinction from
the rest of the community from which they have come. Finally, both sys-
tems address parallel temporal incongruities in that the incumbent of a
legal office is mortal, yet the law is identified with a larger temporality. In
the African case, this larger temporality is cyclical. In the American case,
it is cumulative and reversible.
In contrast to American judicial succession, the African succession ritu-
als referred to here illuminate a cultural armature that is less evident in
the American setting. The African succession rituals negotiate specific ten-
sions between the incumbent's lifetime and the time of the law, in effect,
by separating his person from his body. The office of the ritual chief be-
gins with the birth of the new chief-a second birth that brings him to the
world as chief. His body is unchanged, but his person is now the chief
who occupies and uses his body differently than he did before. The chief
can die; the chiefship is time itself.
In the American context there is no public imagery of rebirth to mark
the formation of a new Justice-of new justice. To do so would be sym-
bolically dangerous, as I have already mentioned, as it would denote the
subordination of the judiciary to the first and second branches, and of law
to politics. The Justices are not politically accountable, yet remain ac-
countable by the same indirection as the Tallensi chiefship: the Tallensi
chief is accountable to the ancestors, and-only through them-to their
living clansmen.7 1 Similarly, the Supreme Court Justices are accountable
to the American people-an ancestral, or mythic/historical invoca-
tion-but not to particular people. The Justices no longer live in a single
time dimension, but in all the times that have been and are the law. This
is one sign of their altered personhood, and it is consistent that they con-
ventionally be held to a public silence, that they forbear from narrating
their own decisions and indecisions as personal events, and that their pri-
mary discourse be written, not spoken. And, as has already been noted,
they must selectively leave the world.
Another sign of their changed personhood, of their second birth-or is
it a first death in the American case?-is the subtle transformation of the
meaning of their physical bodies. The illnesses of the Justices are strik-
ingly downplayed in the press in relation to those of the president, for
example. Their gender, until Justice O'Connor's appointment, was un-
marked (male). Their race, until recently, was unmarked (white), and
now the refraction of this standard creates new generic markers: the pub-
lic refers to "the Jewish seat," "the black seat." Their bodies are seats,
and Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 LAW & Soc'y REv. 687-707 (1988).
71. M. FORTES, supra note 61, at 101.
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just as the African chiefships are stools. 2 The only public relevance of
their bodies, in other words, is in their occupancy (or not) of a seat. This
is not ordinary mortality, with maturation and decline; it is the mortality
of gods, as if Justices were born in full mature form at the bench and died
in full stride. Here, retirement is metaphorical death. The life of a Justice
is no longer the lifetime of the man or woman who became that Justice.
All aspects-biographical and political-of becoming a Justice are sym-
bolically suppressed. Those aspects are precisely the ones that would
(though they cannot) resolve the indeterminacies linking the times of the
individual, the law and the nation in relation to the power of the presi-
dency and the Congress.
To continue the foregoing example, why did the Bashu resolve the
problem of temporal indeterminacy with a sequential doubling (layman/
chief), while American Justices are culturally denied not only their former
social selves, but also their own public initiation? Perhaps one answer lies
in a repetition of the question. The Bashu could construct a public ritual
of becoming, while the Americans cannot. Why, then, was the transition
to chiefship so explicit for the Bashu, and so tacit for the American Jus-
tices? I believe the answer has to do with their respective cultural concep-
tualizations and institutionalizations of politics and social order.
In the case of the Bashu, as already noted, the ultimate order of things
moved through the chief, in his role as a central point of dispersal of local
pollution. The installation ritual equated the chiefship with this role.
Without the chief, there was no cosmic order, and when disorder accumu-
lated, it was supposed to be a sign of the chief's suspended legitimacy. In
the American case, Justices invoke a parallel image of serving as "an in-
strument" of the law"' but with the difference that supposedly coordinate
branches of government also create law on very different terms. The
threat of disorder in the American judiciary is conceptualized as the over-
whelming of the judicial by the political. If the American judiciary avoids
articulating its own initiations, it is perhaps because to do so would be to
offer too unambiguous a gesture toward the other branches. Those are the
branches of events, quid pro quos, representation and fixed terms of of-
fice, that is, of linear time; the judiciary is the branch of all-times, de-
manding of Justices something between renunciation and charisma.74
Yet, part of the story of the world would be the story of rituals and
meanings invented and lost. To turn to the example at hand, if there ever
comes a day when new Supreme Court Justices are inaugurated in a pub-
lic festival, or when Presidents are not, it will be a sign of a profound
72. Id. at 88.
73. This image was Chief Justice Marshall's. See J.B. WHrrE, WHEN WORDs LosE THEIR
MEANING 255 (1984).
74. See J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 1, at 243 (discussion of charisma and tradition as entailing
different temporalities).
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revolution in both the structure of American government and the belief of
the people in the possibility of justice under anything like present terms.
CONCLUSION: CULTURE AND JUSTICE
In this Article, the central theme has been the connections-cultural
connections-between Western conceptions of temporality and the ways in
which the law (in the broad sense of the term) organizes and reproduces
an essentially temporal myth. Linear time, which is the cultural preserve
of national histories and the public institutions that comprise them, domi-
nates those institutional settings only to the extent that the people who
inhabit them (whether managers or employees, presidents or citizens) be-
lieve that linear time has a transcendent reality that allows it to absorb all
the other temporal idioms that also suffuse daily life, and are potentially
its rivals. The Western cultural capacity for that belief was established a
thousand years ago, or longer, when institutional and social structural
changes gave linear time a path from the sacred domain to the domain of
the everyday. That capacity for belief is reproduced in the juxtaposition of
institutional forms and temporalities which constitute everyday experience
in the modern world. "The law" is cultural not only, or not first, in its
patterned processes and outcomes, but in its constitution in multiple tem-
poralities and their indeterminacies. Specifically, law-as an idea-carries
cultural force because it engages these temporalities and their critical in-
congruities so directly.
By exploring contemporary cultural representations of the judiciary,
one can find fresh traces of the journey that linear time makes from the
sacred to the secular, and back again. In the ordered system of symbols
that inhere in the Justices' idealized roles, the multiplicities of time and
time's rival possibilities of order find renewed expression. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to resolve the question of whether Supreme Court
Justices live out the symbols that to some extent define them, or whether
they should. Those are important questions, but of an entirely different
character than the one this essay addresses. That question is about the
means modern society has at its disposal for conceptualizing justice. If
"justice" is constituted in a juxtaposition of temporalities-times and all-
times-then "justice" implies both a progress for the world and a critique,
that is, an imagined vantage point from which history itself might be
judged. While legal actors' claims to legitimacy might be conventionally or
historically cast in terms of the connection between reason and fixed
(timeless) truths, the cultural interpretation developed in this essay has
situated the cultural force of the law in its engagement and resolution of
multiple, mutually contesting temporalities with the potential for posing
rival claims on social actors. To say that the law is cultural does not by
itself dismantle the force of the idea of justice, since just at the point
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where cultural and political inquiry would intersect, justice and Justices
return to the separate temporal domains which, in cultural terms, give
them life.

